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Occupations, Cultures,
and Leadership
in the Army and Air Force
GEORGE R. MASTROIANNI

M

ost discussions of culture in the military services concern the relationship between military and civilian culture. Comparatively less interest
has been shown in the cultural differences among the military services themselves, although there is considerable informal and anecdotal (often humorous) discussion of such differences within the services. In his 1989 book, The
Masks of War, Carl Builder focused on “personality” differences among the
services, and discussed the implications of those differences for defense policy.1 C. Kenneth Allard offered an insightful look at service culture in his thorough analysis of the past and future of jointness in our defense establishment.2
In the United States, the relatively recent separation of the Air Force from the
Army, coupled with the rapid rise of the Air Force as a powerful, independent
institution since World War II, offers a unique opportunity to explore the organizational cultures of these two services, and to better understand the implications of culture on leadership styles in each of the services.

Institutional and Occupational Orientations
One important dimension on which organizational cultures may be
differentiated is the extent to which they are characterized by an institutional
as opposed to an occupational orientation. The institutional orientation is
conceptualized as rooted in a calling to serve higher ideals represented by a
shared vision of an organization, rather than in individual self-interest. The
individual with an occupational orientation, on the other hand, approaches
his or her work as a job, to be retained or abandoned based largely (though
perhaps not solely) on a calculus of self-interest. Charles Moskos warned
76

Parameters

many years ago that the then-imminent advent of the all-volunteer force
brought with it the potential for a shift from an institutional to an occupational
model in the military services.3 Nearly 40 years later, many of the institutional features of military service described by Moskos, including such basic
features as the compensation structure and paternalistic culture, would seem
to be largely intact. Trade unions have made no inroads into the military in
America (as they have elsewhere), and reliance on civilian contractors has
continued, perhaps grown, with no apparent erosion of the traditional institutional character of the military services. There is, nevertheless, a growing
conviction among some that military service is less likely to be conceptualized as a calling today than has been the case in the past, though Andrew
Abbott argues that this trend is apparent in all professions.4
This discussion of institutional and occupational tendencies within
military cultures has struck an especially resonant chord in the Air Force.
James Smith, Mike Thirtle, and William Thomas each see occupationalism as
contributing to centrifugal forces within the Air Force that potentially threaten
cultural identity, individual commitment, unity, and cohesion by fostering
identification with specialized occupation-oriented sub-groups, rather than
with a shared vision of Air Force identity and values.5 This occupational orientation may be a significant factor in differentiating Air Force culture from that
of the other services.

Occupations Affect More than Commitment
Another dimension of service culture influenced by occupational
orientation was suggested to me recently by a senior staff officer from the
military establishment of a European country with whom I was working. He
was describing the challenges inherent in joint staff work. An Army officer
himself, he observed that senior Air Force officers on joint staffs, who are almost exclusively pilots, seemed to him to manage and absorb information in
ways that reflected their occupational training as pilots.
In dealing with complex information from different sources, evaluating and balancing conflicting information, some Air Force officers in staff assignments, he thought, tend to discount inputs not easily and readily assimilated
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into a pre-existing or rapidly developing schema. In the areas of informationgathering, problem-solving, and decisionmaking, some Air Force officers appear to him to behave in the war room as (he believes) they are taught to behave
in the cockpit.
While such remarks might easily be ascribed to the prejudices and
stereotypes that are an all too common feature of human social interaction,
and may represent only one person’s view of his idiosyncratic experiences,
the idea that the weapons warfighters employ, and the social and cognitive adaptations engendered by the use of those weapons, might influence leadership culture more generally, is intriguing. Information flow in the cockpit is
highly sensor- and technology-dependent, highly structured and highly controllable. It is very adaptive for pilots to be very good at shutting out sources
of distraction in moments of crisis. The immediate, ultimate, and unquestionable authority of the aircraft commander in the cockpit is a bedrock element
of Air Force leadership culture.
The argument that my colleague was making was that professional
pilots in staff assignments bring with them some of the same cognitive adaptations that are essential to them in the cockpit, and apply these habits in other
leadership situations, where they are arguably less adaptive. While individual
differences and variability (irrespective of service) undoubtedly account for
more of the variance in performance among officers on a joint staff than those
related to service of origin, there may be at least a grain of truth in my colleague’s observations, a grain that is worth examining more closely.
Of course, there are not only differences among individuals within a
group, but differences among groups in many organizations. Many professions
composed of distinct sub-specialties are characterized by a sort of peckingorder: surgeons are the elite in the medical profession, as are troop-leading
combat-arms soldiers in the Army. Even within the community of pilots, there
are subcultures associated with platform (single-seat and multi-place aircraft)
and mission (air combat, transport, training) that may differ substantially from
one another. Our point concerns not individuals, nor sub-groups, but the organizational culture itself, however, which individuals and sub-groups may participate in and be bound by to varying degrees. A military service dominated by
an occupational culture (or several such cultures) may be affected by that culture in important ways.
It is possible that the particular nature of the occupation in which
military members are engaged may directly affect the way they go about the
business of leadership, and that the nature of this effect may be different in the
different services. This is another, less obvious aspect of service culture. The
occupational profile of a service may also affect organizational forms and
leadership styles indirectly, if that occupational profile is linked to other indi78
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“A cadet remarked . . . that in the Army, the officers
send the enlisted soldiers out to fight,
while in the Air Force, the enlisted folks stay
behind and send the officers out to do the fighting.”

vidual traits or characteristics, such as social, educational, or cultural variables, that are themselves related to organizational behavior.

Leadership: The Roles of Officers and NCOs
An interesting point was brought home to me many years ago, when I
was an Army officer teaching cadets at the US Air Force Academy (USAFA).
During some good-natured banter about Army’s (typically abysmal) performance on the gridiron, a cadet remarked that the difference between the Air
Force and the Army was that in the Army, the officers send the enlisted soldiers
out to fight, while in the Air Force, the enlisted folks stay behind and send the
officers out to do the fighting. I heard this expressed in these same words often
enough by independent sources to realize that it was part of the cultural equipment of the USAFA Cadet Wing at the time. Mistaken as it was, this halfserious jibe contains some ideas worth unpacking.
The roles of officers, NCOs, and enlisted members, and the relationships among them, do seem to vary across the services. In the ground forces,
NCOs are considered the backbone of the service. In the 1970s, General Donn
Starry made famous the term “Sergeant’s Business,” and produced a film by
that name which all Army officers were required to view annually. The film
expressed a fundamental, bedrock element of Army institutional culture: the
vital role played by NCOs in the day-to-day running of the Army, and in the
training and development of young officers. Whatever the service prejudices
of USAFA cadets, the fact is that officers, NCOs, and soldiers do their
warfighting together in the Army—they are interdependent in the most profound and literal sense of that term.
In the Air Force, many pilots do go off and do their fighting on their
own, or at most with a few other pilots or perhaps crewmembers. Certainly
they depend on vital maintenance and logistical support from ground personnel, and certainly the hardships and risks of deployed service are broadly
shared, but relationships between officers and enlisted in the Air Force would
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seem to be necessarily different from such relationships in the Army and Marine Corps. Crew chiefs simply don’t teach pilots how to fly, but NCOs
(among others) do teach young lieutenants how to be good leaders in the
Army and Marine Corps. While relationships between officers and NCOs in
other Air Force career fields may be more parallel to those in the Army, it is
pilots who broadly dominate the leadership and mythology of the Air Force.
Consequently there may be very different leadership styles among senior officers in the different services, conditioned by their different formative experiences as young officers.
There is an interesting social dimension to this difference, as well.
One often hears Army officers and NCOs (even very senior ones) identify
themselves as “soldiers,” as in saying, “Shoot, I’m just an old soldier.” This
kind of downward identification, in which virtually everyone in the Army can
participate, simultaneously has the effect of publicly endorsing a vision of
shared institutional values, and emphasizing the fundamental importance of
everyone in the organization as a vital element of that vision.6 There is not
(and perhaps cannot be) a corresponding statement in the Air Force because,
as Thirtle and Thomas each point out, there is not a similarly widespread vision of shared institutional values in the Air Force.7 People in the Air Force
don’t say, “Shoot, I’m just an old airman.” Pilots are an elite sub-group, distinguished in myriad ways from other members, and it is mainly pilots that
are readily able to participate in a culture rooted in the mythology of aerial
combat. Public Air Force rhetoric tries to capture the sense of teamwork that
comes naturally in the Army by exhorting members to act like “wingmen”
and “airmen,” but the reach of these metaphors is naturally limited.
Because Air Force pilots (who are all officers) are technical experts at
a task to which non-pilots have nothing to contribute, pilots have very different
needs (and perhaps habits) when it comes to seeking out information and advice from others, as compared to ground force officers. For the Army officer,
other officers, NCOs, and soldiers are all valuable resources to be respected for
the expertise and experience they bring to the officer’s warfighting task. Army
combat units are far from democracies or college debating societies, but leadership is not usually viewed exclusively as a form of tyranny. The officer is and
must be in charge, but the quality of the unit’s performance will be determined
by how effectively he or she uses the skills, experience, and leadership of his or
her subordinates in building and developing the unit. This most fundamental
reality of Army leadership engenders a corresponding respect for the importance of human relations in the Army.
In the Air Force, the brotherhood of pilots is necessarily somewhat
separated from the experiences of others by virtue of the specialized nature of
the task: pilots simply don’t need advice from non-pilots on how to fly. The
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myth of the solitary and heroic single-combat warrior is important to Air
Force culture, and it conditions the understanding of Air Force leaders about
the essential nature of leadership. Air Force NCOs are regarded and treated as
the superb professionals they are, but they do not (and cannot) participate in
the dominant warfighting myth in the same way that Army or Marine Corps
NCOs do; their expertise, concerns, and activities overlap only partly with
those of pilots and officers.
The commercial value of an aeronautical rating in the civilian world
also differentiates Air Force officers from their counterparts in the ground
services. Learning to fly immediately creates the potential for a career working as a commercial airline pilot, an attractive and sometimes lucrative profession. While it is difficult to discuss this fact without sounding as if it is
being suggested that Air Force officers are somehow less patriotic, less loyal,
or more mercenary than Army or Navy officers (this is most certainly not
what is being suggested), it cannot be denied that the occupational and institutional dimensions of service culture are simply different across the three
services. In this sense, there is at least the potential for pilots to view the Air
Force as one of several venues that may make it possible for them to continue
in the occupation of flying, while no comparable calculus can exist for infantrymen, tankers, or submariners. Moreover, the expense and importance of
aviation and the aviation-related industry to our economy connect the Air
Force to powerful economic and political forces in society far more directly
than is the case for the other services.

Cognition and Culture
There is a psychological concept called “cognitive dissonance”
which is perhaps relevant when we consider the development of institutional
culture in military settings. Leon Festinger, a social psychologist, asked people to perform a boring and unpleasant task (place a spool on each of 48
wooden pegs in a board, rotate the spool a quarter turn, remove the spool, and
then replace it). After they had finished, he then asked them to tell others
about to perform the task that it was enjoyable and exciting. He paid half the
people a small amount of money to tell the fib, and the other half a much larger
amount. When he then asked the people who had performed this boring task
to rate it using a questionnaire, he found that those who had been paid the
lower amount of money rated it much more favorably than those who had
been paid a large amount of money to fib about the task.8 The explanation is
that humans act to reduce any disconnect between thought and deed. If we are
paid a lot to fib, then we understand what happened and have no need to
change our attitude to make sense of our behavior: we did it for the money.
But if we are paid only a trivial amount, then a dissonance between our attiWinter 2005-06
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“The fact is that officers, NCOs, and soldiers
do their warfighting together in the Army.”

tudes and behavior is apparent. Why lie for a pittance? The behavior is a fact,
so the only way to reduce the dissonance is to make our attitudes more consistent with the behavior.
It may be that the Army and Navy have an easier time creating an institutional culture based on superordinate values and beliefs because most
Army and Navy officers do not have an extrinsic motivator to potentially explain their commitment to military service. Military service as a calling that
transcends self-interest is an especially compelling explanation when behavior and self-interest may appear quite dissonant, as they may for Army or
Navy service members. Military service entails sacrifice: why do we make
those sacrifices? If incentives are offered to serve, either in the form of the opportunity to enter and continue a passionately loved occupation, or as bonuses and flight pay, the transcendent component of motivation to serve may
be less necessary as a way of understanding and explaining one’s behavior.
Moreover, many Air Force members will tell you that they generally sacrifice
much less in terms of creature comforts and other associated costs of military
service than do “grunts.” In fact, many will tell you that is why they chose the
Air Force. The Air Force currently justifies its use of 120-day deployments
(the Marines use nine-month rotations, the Army one year) on the basis of its
view of itself as the “retention” service: because its members are highly
trained in technical specialties, the Air Force uses a shorter, more expensive
deployment cycle to avoid driving them out of the service. But less sacrifice
also means less dissonance to explain, and perhaps further impediments to
the establishment of an overarching institutional orientation.

Service “Personalities”
Just as Army and Air Force cultures seem to differ with respect to the
internal relationships between officers and others, the two services also have
cultivated different global images of the services themselves, determined in
part by the origin and roles of the services. The Army, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps antedate the republic itself—the traditional services have co-evolved
with the country for, quite literally, centuries. The Air Force owes its comparatively recent independent existence not to the progressive, open-minded and
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welcoming spirit of the older services, but to the brute intervention of the civilian government.
Air Force leaders are constantly struggling to symbolically sustain
and justify the independent service identity of the Air Force and to create and
protect a unique Air Force culture comparable to those of the other services.
This mainly manifests itself in the focus on technology in the Air Force, which
is seen as setting the Air Force above the less-technological traditional services. There is an absolutist and anti-intellectual strain in Air Force culture (as
many have observed in military culture more generally) that resonates with a
view of the world as simple and clear. Confidence in the intellectual superiority
of the Air Force over the other services coexists with what sometimes appears
to be contempt for the rough-and-tumble of open intellectual discourse. The
paradox of Air Force culture is that it can be decidedly anti-intellectual—a circumstance perhaps not uncommon in authoritarian cultures such as the military—but nevertheless convinced of its intellectual superiority. This tendency
is perhaps stronger in the Air Force than in the other services.
These aspects of global Air Force culture also affect organizational
forms and penetrate the thinking of the rank and file, implicitly modeling a
more hierarchical, executive, personal model of decisionmaking that shapes
the culture of leadership in the Air Force. The responsibility of the Air Force
for controlling a component of the American strategic nuclear deterrent may
also have led to broad institutional reliance on organizational models characterized by concentration and elevation of decisionmaking power in highly
centralized structures.
Controversy over the centralization of command authority and tactical
decisionmaking in the Army has been a prominent feature of post-World War II
discussions of Army culture. David Hackworth’s colorful and interesting account of his experiences as an Army officer in the decades after World War II
chronicle the struggles of the Army to adapt to the political, technological, and
social upheaval of the postwar era.9 More recently, Donald Vandergriff, and also
Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, have offered systematic analyses of the challenges confronting Army culture.10 Perhaps because the Army has existed long
enough to have been repeatedly, and sometimes brutally, forced to reexamine its
role in national defense, self-reflection and analysis are vital components of
Army culture. General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, said recently,
“We must be prepared to question everything” in endorsing innovation and culture change in the Army.11

More Technical, Less Dominative?
Morris Janowitz argued 45 years ago that as the military services became more technical, organizational patterns would shift in the direction of
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more “manipulative” (or managerial) and less “dominative” (or authoritarian) relationships.12 Bengt Abrahamsson extended this hypothesis a decade
later by arguing that this tendency would be greater in the Air Force than in
the Army, based on the fundamentally technological orientation of the Air
Force.13 Many seem to intuitively accept the truth of this proposition, embracing a perception of the Air Force as a kinder, gentler kind of military organization. The reality, however, may be more complicated than Abrahamsson
thought. Perhaps the superficial gentility of the Air Force masks an underlying leadership culture that is as fundamentally authoritarian as that of the
ground forces, or even more so. Perhaps the superficial gruffness of the
ground forces exists in a culture which embraces human interaction in a more
sophisticated way than meets the eye. While there has been some effort to
study authoritarian attitudes in military settings, relatively little effort has
been devoted to directly comparing the services themselves, so these perceptions must remain largely untested.14
Given that the cultural identity of the Air Force includes a vision of
the Air Force as the progressive and modern service, it is perhaps paradoxical, then, that in some ways the Air Force appears to be far more insular and
conservative than the older services. Officer development and education at
the service academies offer an illustrative comparison. As West Point has
changed its curriculum to prepare officers to cope with the manifold challenges of military service in the 21st century by better balancing technical and
nontechnical subjects, the Air Force Academy has recently shifted the balance among its academic programs in favor of science and technology. As the
Army has responded to the global challenges of the new century with greater
openness and flexibility (at least educationally), the Air Force has narrowed
its focus still more tightly on technology.15

More Technical, More Dominative?
The hypothesis that more technical military cultures (such as that of
the Air Force) are likely to be less authoritarian may simply be wrong. In certain circumstances, highly technical occupations may generate a heightened
risk for the development of insular and autocratic cultures, if steps are not
taken to prevent the development of such cultures. In highly exclusive technical organizations, the sophisticated nature of the daily work limits opportunities for participation by people who do not share the required education or
expertise, and often the experience and worldview, of technical experts. In
the military, this isolation is exacerbated by the tight control over entry to
elite circles and access to power that is possible for members of the expert
group. Because accountability in such systems is weak, there may be systematic biases in selection for positions of authority that are difficult to assess or
84
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control.16 Both by selection of like-minded people and by suppression of dissent through coercive application of authority, views and opinions contrary to
those of the power elites are easily discounted.
Even outside the military, the nature of technical work itself can
lead to habits of thought that may militate against the kind of agonizing and
searching consideration of difficult and complex issues that is so vital in
today’s operational environment. Engineering, medicine, and intelligence
work are examples of areas where some or all of these factors are especially
dominant. Engineers recognize that due to the nature of their work, extraordinary measures may need to be taken to ensure that they continue to think in
creative ways. NASA’s tragic failures in the shuttle program have been attributed largely to management structures unable to adequately process unwelcome ideas and criticisms from employees, rather than technical mistakes.
The incredible achievements of our industrial laboratories and manufacturing plants remind us, however, that whatever the potentially stultifying effects of technical work might be, they can be spectacularly overcome.
While nonmilitary organizations dominated by technical occupations
may be somewhat prone to exclusivity and insularity, it is the case that the combination of modern bureaucracy and human psychological and social characteristics can produce such outcomes in all walks of life. An excellent example
of the hazards of insular and exclusive organizational cultures in a nontechnical occupation is the release by CBS News of apparently forged letters about
President Bush’s National Guard service during the Vietnam War in the last
presidential campaign. In this instance journalism, an occupation founded on
the basis of objectivity, was shown to be vulnerable to these same hazards of
elitism and exclusivity. It happens that in the case of CBS, the exclusivity was
rooted in political, not technical, qualifications. While technical organizations
may be especially susceptible to the development of exclusive organizational
climates, any organization (including liberal arts colleges) can easily fall prey
to the same problems. Groupthink occurs in all kinds of groups: it just occurs
more readily in some groups than in others.

Social and Cultural Issues
There may also be linkages between occupational preferences and
other individual characteristics relevant to leadership and service culture.
Morris Rosenberg’s classic study of occupations and values offered intriguing glimpses of the apparently complex web of correlations among occupational preferences, values, and attitudes.17 Abrahamsson noted, as many have,
the similarities between military and religious or monastic organizational
structures.18 While Rosenberg did not study the relationship between occupational choices and religiosity, it may be the case that certain occupational catWinter 2005-06
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“Public Air Force rhetoric tries to capture
the sense of teamwork that comes
naturally in the Army.”

egories are more or less likely to attract people with strong religious views
than others. If this is so, and if organizations are dominated by people in one
or a few occupational categories, then the potential for differentiation from
society on related variables (such as religiosity) exists.
It appears that such differentiation may be occurring in parts of our
military establishment. For example, pervasive cultural issues involving perceived religious intolerance among some of the leadership, staff, faculty, and
cadets recently reported at the Air Force Academy may indicate that just such
a differentiation has occurred at that institution. The Air Force Academy is located in Colorado Springs, home to several large evangelical churches, and
the area is a popular assignment and retirement destination for many service
members. The problems uncovered at the Air Force Academy19 may be indicative of nothing more than a local cultural issue, but these problems may also
suggest a more widespread and deeper trend: perhaps the demographic
changes in our military over the past decades have contributed to subtle
changes in the proportion or distribution of people with particular religious
beliefs in the services more broadly.
John Brinsfield reports that Army soldiers self-identify as members
of specific religious traditions at about the same rate (64 percent) as members
of society at large (63 percent).20 It is not known, however, exactly how the military differs from society as a whole in the proportion or distribution of particular religious sub-groups. David Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal report that
approximately four times as many military members (11 percent) identify
themselves as “other Christian” than do members of the general population,
(three percent) while correspondingly fewer self-identify as Protestant, Roman
Catholic, or Orthodox.21 Because of inconsistencies and difficulties in collecting data on religious beliefs, it is difficult to know what to make of these differences. It is clear that on certain issues with a religious dimension, such as
tolerance of differences in sexual orientation, the views of some military members diverge from those of the population as a whole.22 Are there differences in
the religious views of service members and civilians, of officers and enlisted,
in higher- and lower-ranking officers, in members of the different services, of
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different occupational groups or organizations within the services? If such differences exist, do they matter?
These questions may be important to consider in the future. Military
members identify themselves as Republicans with considerably greater frequency than do Americans as a whole.23 While it has been argued that the political identification of military members has not really changed much over
the last several decades,24 the last two election cycles have raised fears that
the body politic may be becoming more polarized. If so, then the demographic asymmetry between the military and society will amplify political
differences between the military and at least a sizable portion of civil society.
A military self-image as an island of traditional American moral and religious
values in a sea of post-modern relativism25 is fraught with the potential to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, strains in civil-military relations. This particular aspect of civil-military relations is ripe for further research.

Army Culture and Fourth-Generation Warfare
Thomas Hammes argues that the dominant form of warfare over the
last half-century has been so-called fourth-generation warfare.26 This form of
warfare, an evolved form of insurgency, “does not attempt to win by defeating
the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via diverse networks, fourth-generation
warfare directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the
enemy’s political will.”27
This may not be the way we want to fight, but it may be the way we
have to fight, because our enemies perceive that it is the only form of warfare
in which we can be confronted with some prospect of success. If this is so,
then what is needed in our defense establishment is not transformation into a
better, more technological, conventional (third-generation warfare) force,
but transformation into a force with a very different mix of capabilities. We
are only beginning to understand what the nature and extent of the changes required as part of that transformation may be, but they will be tectonic in their
far-reaching effects on the status quo.
The Army will face monumental challenges to its combat-arms culture, rooted (as Carl Builder suggests) in the spectacularly successful march
across Europe in 1944-1945, as it confronts the prospect of the nonlinear battlefield fundamentally changing the dominant image of warfighting that has
served so long and so well. Concerns about the cultural effects of focusing on
roles other than full-scale conventional combat foreshadow the strains that
will challenge unity and cohesion in the Army.28
John Gordon and Jerry Sollinger suggest that Army culture needs to
change by embracing a shift to a role as the “supporting service.”29 This shift,
they believe, is conditioned by the growing reliance of national power elites
Winter 2005-06
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on air power as a first response in crises, and on the centrality of air power to
early military successes in Iraq and elsewhere. But Hammes points out that
our enemies, closely watching the unfolding events in Iraq, will be less and
less likely to engage us on terms that allow us to apply such power in the future, and more likely to engage us on terms favorable to them.30 Air power was
decisive in achieving the military objectives set early in the Iraq campaign,
but the political objectives of our involvement in Iraq still seem a long way
from being met as of autumn 2005.
Gordon and Sollinger offer no suggestions for changes in Air Force
culture, but it would seem that the key role of Air Force and Navy aviation,
exemplified to them by three incidents from the early stages of the Iraq war,
has been less apparent as the war has continued, and may remain so as the war
seems poised to continue for perhaps several more years.31 It is the Air Force
that has settled into a role as the supporting service, and will probably continue in that role in Iraq indefinitely. Under these circumstances, perhaps Air
Force culture is also in need of reconsideration of its “Cold War mindset,” as
Gordon and Sollinger recommend for the Army.

Conclusions
It would seem that the shift to the all-volunteer force did not immediately lead to wholesale disruptions in the institutional culture of the services,
nor to an obvious rise in occupational attitudes. Thirty years on, however,
new pressures appear to be building that again suggest we should turn our attention to service culture and proactively manage the consequences of looming changes in our defense establishment and posture.
What are these pressures? Growing reliance on bonuses and reenlistment incentives may affect the occupational orientation of service members.
While noble ideals and self-interest probably coexist in the motivational structures of all service members, the proportions may be undergoing differential
change in different groups. The Army’s “Blue to Green” initiative, which
hopes to attract Air Force and Navy personnel affected by downsizing in their
home services to transfer to the Army, brings into sharp focus these motivational dimensions of service culture.
These issues can become only more important in the future. As the
strains on our Guard and Reserve forces continue to grow, more creative ways
to make military service more attractive will be sought. For example, General
James Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, recently warned of the potentially
negative effects of paying reservists an extra $1,000 per month to accept a
second mobilization assignment.32 The Army appears poised to rely more and
more heavily on financial and other incentives to attract recruits. Adaptation
to these changes will challenge the Army’s institutional culture.
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By far the greatest pressure will come from the need to adapt existing service cultures to the realities of fourth-generation warfare. Defining the
“heart and soul” of institutions is a continual process of preserving traditional
conceptions while at the same time updating, refining, and sometimes replacing them as conditions change.33 Organizations with long, storied histories
and strong traditions are perhaps best equipped to withstand these periodic
redefinitions. A certain comfort and security comes with the knowledge that
an organization has survived great upheaval before.
The Army is already questioning everything, and is confronting the
challenge of cultural change head-on. Within the Air Force, the broadly accepted institutional culture that is characteristic of the other services has arguably not yet developed, and, as a result, the Air Force may face greater
institutional challenges in these times of turbulence and uncertainty. Accustomed to seeing itself as the preeminent, modern branch of the service overtaking the roles of the traditional services, the Air Force has not had to
develop the kind of self-reflective and self-critical leadership culture that
“questions everything.”
Both the Air Force and the Army face an uncomfortable future in
which existing capabilities and associated cultures may require significant
retooling. The Army has adapted to such changes before, and has successfully retained (or recovered) its traditional institutional culture. European
military establishments, though rooted in fundamentally different cultures,
already have had to adapt to many of the same pressures we now face. The Air
Force has not yet had to renew itself in the far-reaching ways events now seem
to demand. We may not yet be able to see the contours of the successful adaptations that lie ahead for the two services, but we can be sure that they will ultimately be rooted not only in technological wizardry, but also in a better
understanding of the human and cultural dimensions of service and sacrifice
in an age that promises to demand a great deal more of both.
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